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Fair representation of voters in a committee representing different voters’ groups is 
being broadly discussed during last few years. Assuming we know what the fair 
representation is, there exists a problem of optimal quota: given a “fair” distribution 
of voting weights, how to set up voting rule (quota) in such a way that distribution 
of relative a priori voting power is as close as possible to distribution of relative 
voting weights. Together with optimal quota problem a problem of t rade-off 
between fairness and efficiency (ability of a voting body to change status quo) is 
formalized by a fairness-efficiency matrix. 
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Let us consider n units (e.g. regions, political parties) with different size of population 
(voters), represented in a super-unit committee that decides different agendas relevant for the 
whole entity. Each unit representation in the committee has some voting weight (number of 
votes). By voting system we mean an allocation of voting weights in elections and 
committees, the form of the ballot and rules for counting the votes to determine outcome of 
voting. 
Voting weight is not the same thing as voting power. Usually voting power means an 
ability to influence outcome of voting. Voting power indices are used to evaluate a probability 
that a particular voter is “decisive in voting” in the sense that if her vote is YES, then the 
outcome of voting in committee is YES, and if she votes NO, the outcome is NO.  
Two aspects of voting systems are being discussed: fairness and efficiency. While the 
fairness is related to distribution of voting power among different actors of voting, efficiency 
is an ability of the system to change status quo. 
Concept of fairness is usually based on the following rather artificial construction: 
Decision making process is performed by series of referenda in each unit and units’ 
representations in the committee are voting according results of referenda. In each unit an 
individual citizen has one vote that provides him with a voting power (each citizen from one 
unit has the same voting power). Each unit representation has some voting power in the super-
unit committee that follows from its voting weight in the committee. Indirect voting power of 
a citizen from particular unit is given by product of her voting power in local referenda and   2
voting power of her unit representation in the committee. Fair representation of units in the 
super-unit committee means that each citizen has the same indirect voting power 
independently of the unit he belongs to. 
Voting power is not directly observable: as a proxy for it voting weights are used 
(number of seats, number of votes etc.). Therefore, fairness is usually defined in terms of 
voting weights (e.g. voting weights proportional to results of election). 
Concept of efficiency is based on a probability that a proposal will be passed in the 
committee. Used term “ efficiency” is rather misleading; it is frequently interpreted as an 
ability of a voting body to make decision. Concept itself is based on Coleman’s “ability of a 
collectivity to act” (Coleman 1971). In the voting committee any voting act is a choice of one 
of two alternatives: voted proposal (change of status quo) against status quo. The change is 
approved if it is supported by members representing at least total weight q, while status quo is 
maintained in the opposite case. Henceforth status quo is implicitly considered to be less 
“desirable” than its change. In fact Coleman’s concept, used in recent literature under the 
label of “efficiency” provides probability of changing the status quo.  
Extension of the European Union and related changes in its voting system became a 
new impulse in discussions about fairness and efficiency. In the late spring of 2004 the open 
letter of European scientists to the governments of the EU member states was distributed in 
European academic community.
1 The basic idea of the proposal supported by the open letter 
is the following concept of “fairness”: If the European Union is a union of citizens, then it is 
fair when each citizen (independently on her national affiliation) exercises the same influence 
over the union issues. It is achieved when voting weight of each national representation in 
Council of Ministers is proportional to the square root of population. 
  So called square root rule is attributed to British statistician Lionel Penrose (1946) and 
is closely related to indirect voting power measured by Penrose-Banzhaf power index. 
Different aspects of square root rule had been analysed in Felsenthal and Machover (1998), 
2004), Laruelle and Widgrén (1998), Baldwin and Widgrén (2004), Turnovec (2009). Square 
root rule “fairness” in the EU Council of Ministers voting was discussed and evaluated in 
Felsenthal and Machover (2007), Słomczyński and Życzkowski (2006, 2007), Leech and Aziz 
(2008) and others. Concept of efficiency is attributed to Coleman (1971) so called “ power of 
                                                 
1 Open letter was originally signed by the group of nine distinguished scientists from the six EU countries, 
calling themselves “Scientists for a democratic Europe”, later cosigned by 38 other colleagues, and submitted to 
the governments of member states and to Commission. The letter (including tables with results for EU of 25 
members) and list of its signatories see e.g. at the following web address: 
http://www.esi2.us.es/~mbilbao/pdffiles/letter.pdf.   3 
collectivity to act” (application to Council of Ministers voting see in Hosli (2008), Leech and 
Aziz (2008) ). 
  This paper is not focused particularly on European Union. Assuming, that a principle 
of fairness is selected for a distribution of voting weights, we are addressing the question how 
to achieve equality of voting power (at least approximately) to fair voting weights with a 
“reasonable” level of efficiency. The concepts of strictly proportional power introduced by Berg 
and Holler (1986) and of optimal quota of Słomczyński and Życzkowski (2007) are used to 
find, given voting weights, a quota minimizing a distance between actors’ voting weights and 
their power indices. 
  In the second section basic definitions are introduced and used power indices 
methodology shortly resumed. Third section introduces concept of quota intervals of stable 
power and optimal quota, and a trade-off between fairness and efficiency, represented by a 
fairness-efficiency matrix is discussed. While the framework of analysis of fairness and 
efficiency is usually restricted to Penrose-Banzhaf concept of power, we are treating it in a more 
general framework and our results are relevant for any power index based on pivots or swings 
and for any concept of fairness.    
 
2. Committees and voting power  
 
Simple weighted committee is a pair [N, w], where N be a finite set of n committee 
members n i ,..., 2 , 1 = , and w = (w1, w2, … , wn) be a nonnegative vector of committee members’ 
voting weights (e.g. votes or shares). By 2
N we denote power set of N (set of all subsets of N). 
By voting configuration we mean an element S ˛ 2
N, subset of committee members voting 




i w S w ) ( denotes voting weight of configuration S. Voting 
rule is defined by quota q, satisfying  ) ( 0 N w q £ < , where q represents minimal total weight 
necessary to approve the proposal. Triple [N, q, w] we call a simple quota weighted committee. 
Voting configuration S in committee [N, q, w] is called a winning one if  q S w ‡ ) (  and a losing 
one in the opposite case. 
Voting power analysis seeks an answer to the following question: Given a simple quota 
weighted committee ] , , [ w q N , what is an influence of its members over the outcome of voting? 
Absolute voting power of a member i is defined as a probability  ] , , [ Π w q N i that i will be   4
decisive in the sense that such situation appears in which she would be able to decide the 





















Two basic concepts of decisiveness are used: swing position as an ability of individual 
voter to change by unilateral switch from YES to NO outcome of voting, and pivotal position, 
such position of individual voter in a permutation of voters expressing ranking of attitudes of 
members to voted issue (from most preferable to least preferable) and corresponding order of 
forming of winning configuration, in which her vote YES means YES outcome of voting and her 
vote NO means NO outcome of voting. 
Let us denote by si(N, q, w) the number of swing positions of the i-th member and by 
pi(N, q, w) the number of pivotal positions of the i-th member in simple quota weighted 
committee [N, q, w].  
Assuming many voting acts and all configurations equally likely, it makes sense to 
evaluate a priori voting power of each member of the committee by probability to have a swing, 






Nq - P= w  
(si is the number of swings of the member i and 2
n-1 is the number of configurations with i). 















Assuming many voting acts and all possible preference orderings equally likely, it makes 
sense to evaluate an a priori voting power of each committee member as a probability of being in 
pivotal situation, measured by Shaply-Shubik (SS) power index (Shapley and Shubik (1954)): 







P= w  
(pi is the number of pivotal positions of the committee member i, and n! is the number of 

















w ,   5 
i.e. absolute and relative form of the SS-power index is the same.
2 
  Let us denote by W[N, q,  w] set of all winning configuration in a simple  quota 









we denote efficiency of voting rule q, probability that a proposal will be passed in committee 
[N, q, w] providing all voting configurations (or all preference orderings) are equally likely. 
It can be easily seen that for any a > 0 and any power index based on swings or pivots it 
holds that ] , , [ ] , , [ w w q N q N i i P = P a a . Therefore, without loss of generality we shall assume 




i w 1 and 0 < q £ 1, using in analysis only relative weights and 
relative quotas. 
Committee [N, q, w] has a property of strictly proportional power (Berg and Holler 
(1986)) if  w w π = ] , , [ q N  (i.e. the relative voting power of committee members is equal to their 
relative voting weights). The case of strictly proportional power seldom occurs.  
 
3. Fairness and efficiency of voting system and quota intervals of stable power  
 
  Let  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n w w w = w  be a fair distribution of voting weights (whatever principle is 
used to justify it), then the voting system used is fair if the committee [N, q, w] has the property 
of strictly proportional power. For given N and w the only variable we can vary to design fair 






                                                 
2 Supporters of Penrose-Banzhaf power concept are sometimes refusing Shapley-Shubik index as a measure of 
voting power. Their objections to Shapley-Shubik power concept are based on classification of power measures on 
so called I-power (voter’s potential influence over the outcome of voting) and P power (expected relative share in a 
fixed prize available to the winning group of committee members, based on cooperative game theory) introduced by 
Felsenthal, Machover and Zwicker (1998). Shapley-Shubik power index was declared to represent P -power and as 
such unusable for measuring influence in voting.  We  tried to  show  (Turnovec (2007), Turnovec, Mercik, 
Mazurkiewicz (2008)) that objections against Shapley-Shubik power index, based on its interpretation as a P-power 
concept, are not sufficiently justified. Both Shapley-Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf measure could be successfully 
derived as cooperative game values, and at the same time both of them can be interpreted as probabilities of being in 
some decisive position (pivot, swing) without using cooperative game theory at all.  
   6
Proposition 1  
Let [N, q1, w] and [N, q2, w], q1 „ q2, be two simple quota weighted committees such that 
W[N, q1, w] = W[N, q2, w], then 
) , , ( ) , , ( 2 1 w w q N s q N s i i =  
and 
) , , ( ) , , ( 2 1 w w q N p q N p i i =  
for all i ˛ N. 
 
In two different committees with the same set of members, the same weights and the same set 
of winning configurations the PB-power indices (SS-power indices) are the same for all 
members, independently on quotas. 
 
Proposition 2 
Let [N, q, w] be a simple quota weighted committee, then  
) , 1 , ( ) , , ( w w e + - = q N s q N s i i  
and 
) , 1 , ( ) , , ( w w e + - = q N p q N p i i  






˛ e .  
Given a voting quota q, 1-q+e (for sufficiently small e>0) is called a blocking quota (total 
weight required to block a proposal). From Proposition 2 it follows that blocking power of the 
committee members is equal to their voting power.   
 
Proposition 3 


























Then for any particular quota q we have W[N, q, w] = W[N, g, w] for all  
g ˛ (q-m
-(q), q+m
+(q)].   7 
  Proof: If S ˛ W[N, q, w] and q < g £ q+m
+(q), then  
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j j
S j
j N S q w w q q w ] , , [ ) ( 0 w g g m  
If S ˛ W[N, q, w] and q > g ‡ q-m









j N W S q q w w q w ] , , [ ) ( 0 w g m g   
Winning configurations S for quota q are winning also for any quota g ˛ (q-m
-(q), q+m
+(q)]. 
If S ˛ 2
N\W[N, g, w] and q < g £ q+m
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If S ˛ 2









j j N W S q w w q q w ] , , [ \ 2 ) ( 0 w g g m  
Any losing configuration S for quota g ˛ (q-m
-(q), q+m
+(q)] is losing also for quota q.￿ 
From Proposition 1 it follows that swing or pivot based power indices are the same for 
all quotas g ˛ (q-m
-(q), q+m
+(q)]. Therefore interval of quotas (q-m
-(q), q+m
+(q)] we call an 
interval of stable power for quota q. Quota g* ˛ (q-m
-(q), q+m
+(q)] is called marginal quota 
for q if m
+ (g*) = 0.  
  
Example 1 
Consider committee [N, q, w] where n = 3, w1 = 0.1, w2 = 0.4, w3 = 0.5. Then  
2
N = (˘, {1}, {2}, {3}, {1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}, {1,2,3}) . Consider simple majority quota q = 
0.51. Then 
W[N, q, w] = ({1,3}, {2,3}, {1,2,3}), 2
N\W[N, q, w] = (˘, {1}, {2}, {3},{1,2}). 
m
+(q) = min {w1 + w3 –  0.51 = 0.09, w2 + w3 – 0.51 = 0.39, w1 + w2 + w3 – 0.51 = 0.49} = 
0.09 
m
-(q) = min {0.51 –  w1 = 0.41, 0.51 –  w2 = 0.11, 0,51-w3=0,0,01,0.51 –  w1 –  w2  = 0.01} = 
0.01 
Quota interval of stable power for quota q = 0.51 is (0.5, 0.6], marginal quota for q = 0.51 is 
g* = 0.6. 
Define a partition of the power set 2
N into equal weight classes W0, W1, … , Wr (such 
that the weight of different configurations from the same class is the same and the weights of 
different configurations from different classes are different). Clearly it holds that r £ 2
n-1. For   8
completeness set w(˘) = 0. Consider weight increasing ordering of equal weight classes W
(0), 
W(1), … , W
(r) such that for any t < k and S ˛ W(t), R ˛ W(k) it holds that w(S) < w(R). 
Denote qt = w(S) for any S ˛ W





(1), … , W
(r) be the weight increasing ordering of equal weight partition of 2
N. Set qt 
= w(S) for any S ˛ W
(t), t = 0, 1, 2, … , r. Then there is a finite number r £ 2
n-1 of marginal 
quotas qt and corresponding intervals of stable power (qt-1, qt] such that W[N, qt, w] ￿ W[N, 
qt-1, w] . 
 
Analysis of voting power as a function of quota (given voting weights) can be substituted by 
analysis of voting power in finite number of marginal quotas. 
 
Example 2 
In committee from Example 1 order all voting configuration by their weights: 
 
t  W
(t)    w(S)   
__________________________ 
0  ˘      0 
1  {1}    0.1 
2  {2}    0.4 
3  {1, 2}, {3}  0.5 
4  {1, 3}    0.6 
5  {2,3)    0.9 
6  {1,2,3}  1 
 
We have 7 classes of equal weight voting configurations ordered by weights and r = 6. There 
exist 6 quota intervals of stable power and corresponding marginal quotas and 6 different 
vectors of power indices: 
 
t  .interval  marginal  number  SS-power    PB-power 
      quota    of WC    
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
1  (0, 0.1]    0.1    7    (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)   (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)  
2  (0.1, 0.4]  0.4    6    (0, 1/2, 1/2)      (0, 1/2, 1/2)  
3  (0.4, 0.5]  0.5    5    (1/6, 1/6, 4/6)   (1/5, 1/5, 3/5) 
4  (0.5, 0.6]  0.6    3    (1/6, 1/6, 4/6)   (1/5, 1/5, 3/5) 
5  (0.6, 0.9]  0.9    2    (0, 1/2, 1/2)     (0, 1/2, 1/2) 
6  (0,9, 1]    1    1    (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)   (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) 
   9 
Proposition 5 
Let q1, q2, … , qr be the set of all majority marginal quotas in simple quota  weighted 
committee [N, q, w] and p
k
 be a vector of relative power indices corresponding to marginal 









=‡= ￿￿ π w 
Proof follows from Berg and Holler (1986), who introduced the concept of strictly 
proportional power. They provide the following property of simple weighted committees: Let 
[N, Q, w] be a finite family of simple quota weighted committees with the same weights w 
and set of different relative quotas Q = {q1, q2, … , qm}. Let j(Q) be a probability distribution 
over Q where jk is a probability with which a random mechanism selects the quota qk and 
pik(N, qk, w) be a power index in the committee [N, qk, w] with a quota qk ˛ Q, then  








= ￿ ww  
is an expected relative power of the member i in the randomized committee [N, l(Q), w]. For 
any vector of relative weights there exist a finite set Q of relative quotas qk such that 0,5 < qk 
£ 1, and a probability distribution l such that 






== ￿ λ ww  
Randomized voting rule l(Q) leads to strictly proportional power.￿ 
Example 3 



































3 2 1 = = = l l l    10










3 2 1 = = = l l l , then mathematical expectation of SS-power of the 
members of the committee will be equal to their relative weights (we obtain the case of 
strictly proportional power).  
   One can hardly expect that randomized voting rules leading to strictly proportional 
power would be adopted by actors of real voting systems. However, design of a “fair” voting 
system can be based on an approximation provided by quota generating minimal distance 
between vectors of power indices and weights. 
  In political science the concept of deviation from proportionality is used defined as 
follows: 
  Let vi be a share of votes political party i obtained in election and si be a share of seats 
allocated to party i in the elected body, then deviation from proportionality index is defined as  
) , ( 1 ) ( v s v s, d - = d  
where d(s,w) is a normalized distance between vectors s and w (with values between 0 and 1). 
Clearly 0 £ d(s,v)£1, d(s,v)=1 means full proportionality, d(s,v)=0 means full 
disproportionality. Depending on used definition of distance political science proposes 
Loosemore-Hanby (1971) absolute values deviation metric 
￿ - =
i
i i LH v s abs d ) (
2
1
) , ( v s  
that leads to proportionality index  
￿ - - =
i
i i AV v s abs ) (
2
1
1 ) , ( v s d     
or least squares metric (Gallagher 1991)   
￿ - =
i




) , ( v s  
  that leads to least squares proportionality index 
￿ - - =
i




1 ) , ( v s d     
By analogy let us introduce least squares index of fairness substituting relative weights wi for 
vi and relative power pi for si: 
￿ - - =
i
i i LS w q N q N 2 ) , , [ (
2
1
1 ) ], , , [ ( w] w w p p f       11 
 Considering f to be a function of q a good approximation of a fair quota is a marginal quota 
maximizing index of fairness. 
  To maximize f is the same as to minimize sum of square residuals between the power 
indices and voting weights by q: 





=- ￿ w  
The quota minimizing s
2 was introduced by Słomczyński and Życzkowski (2006, 2007) and 
called an optimal quota. 
  Słomczyński and Życzkowski introduced optimal quota concept within the framework 
of so called Penrose voting system as a principle of fairness in the EU Council of Ministers 
voting measured by Penrose-Banzhaf power index. The system consists of two rules: 
  a) The voting weight attributed to each member of the voting body of size n is 
proportional to the square root of population he or she represents; 
  b) The decision of the voting body is taken if the sum of the weights of members 
supporting it is not less than the optimal quota.
3 
   Looking for a quota providing a priori voting power “as close as possible” to the 
normalized voting weights, Słomczyński and Życzkowski are minimizing the sum of square 
residuals between the power indices and voting for q ˛ (0.5, 1]. They propose two heuristic 






























 Proposition 6 
Let [N, q, w] be a simple weighted committee, then there exists exact solution of Słomczyński 
and Życzkowski optimal quota (SZ optimal quota) problem 
( )




=- ￿ w  
where j = 1, 2, … , r, r is the number of intervals of stable power such that  qj are marginal 




                                                 
3 Słomczyński and Życzkowski (2007), p. 393.   12
Proof follows from finite number of quota intervals of stable power (Proposition 4). Quota q* 
provides best approximation of strictly proportional power, that is related neither to particular 
power measure nor to specific principle of fairness.￿ 
Example 4  
Values of index of fairness for majority marginal quotas in committees from Example 1 
 
Shapley-Shubik relative power 
member  Weight  SS q4=0,6  SS q5=0,9  SS q6=1 
1  0,1  0,166667  0  0,333333 
2  0,4  0,166667  0,5  0,333333 
3  0,5  0,666667  0,5  0,333333 
￿  1  1  1  1 
f(qt)    0,791833  0,9  0,791833 
 
 
Penrose-Banzhaf relative power 
member  Weight  SS q4=0,6  SS q5=0,9  SS q6=1 
1  0,1  0,2  0  0,333333 
2  0,4  0,2  0,5  0,333333 
3  0,5  0,6  0,5  0,333333 
￿  1  1  1  1 
f(qt)    0,826795  0,9  0,791833 
 
The exact optimal quota is q* = q4 = 0,9 (and all quotas q ˛ (0.6, 0.9]). Compare to 
Słomczyński and Życzkowski approximations: qs = 0,79, qn = 0,82. 
  Together with problem of legitimacy (fairness) designers of voting systems are 
concerned with ability of voting body to change status quo (efficiency), 
 
Proposition 7 









 is non-increasing function of quota q and attains finite number of values between 0 and 1. 
 
Proof follows from properties of marginal quotas: finiteness of the number of marginal 




+ ￿ ww , see Proposition 4.￿ 
Being able to calculate all marginal quotas we have all possible levels of efficiency in 
simple weighted committee and can compare them with appropriate values of index of 






















r qqq <<<<£ ), rows 
correspond to marginal quotas and columns to fairness index and efficiency index 
  While the index of fairness is not a monotonic function of quota, efficiency index is 
strictly decreasing with increase of quota. Then there is always a problem of trade-off 
between fairness and efficiency, problem of choice of a row from fairness-efficiency matrix, 
using approaches of multi-criteria optimization. 
 
Example 5 
Fairness-efficiency matrix for marginal majority quotas in committee from Example 1. 













0.6  3  0,375  0,79183 
0.9  2  0,25  0,9 
1  1  0,125  0,79183 
 













0.6  3  0,375  0,82679 
0.9  2  0,25  0,9 
1  1  0,125  0,79183 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In the simple weighted committee with fixed number of members and voting weights 
there exists a finite number r of different quota intervals of stable power (r £ 2n-1) generating 
finite number of power indices vectors. 
Voting power is equal to blocking power what implies that number of different power 
indices vectors corresponding to majority quotas is equal at most to int(r/2) + 1  
If the fair distribution of voting weights is defined, then fair distribution of voting 
power means to find a quota that minimizes distance between relative voting weights and 
relative voting power. Index of fairness is not a monotonic function of quota.     14
Problem of optimal quota has an exact solution via finite number of majority marginal 
quotas. 
Index of efficiency defined as a probability to change status quo has also finite number 
of values corresponding to marginal quotas and is monotonic (decreasing) function of 
marginal quotas 
Problem „fairness versus efficiency“ can be represented by fairness-efficiency matrix 
and treated by methods of multi-objective decision making   
Słomczyński and Życzkowski introduced optimal quota concept within the framework 
of so called Penrose voting system as a principle of fairness in the EU Council of Ministers 
voting and related it exclusively to Penrose-Banzhaf power index and square root rule 
Fairness in voting systems, efficiency and approximation of strictly proportional 
power is not exclusively related to Penrose square-root rule and Penrose-Banzhaf definition of 
power, as it is usually done in discussions about the EU voting rules. In this paper it is treated 
in a more general setting as a property of any simple weighted committee and any well 
defined power measure. Fairness and its approximation, optimal quota and quota intervals of 
stable power are not specific properties of Penrose-Banzhaf power index. 
The choice of “fairness principle” in the EU decision making is a problem of political 
consensus of member states and cannot be resolved by “ scientific community” and by 
mathematical models, but clarification, clear formulation and representation of the problem 
can be of help in political decisions. What one can expect from social choice theory is a 
contribution to mathematically rigorous implementation of selected principle. 
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